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lN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DOYLE L. A LLHED, Administrator
of the Estate of James F. Allred,

1

der('H~l'd,

Plaintiff' and Appr>llant,
-\'S,-

\·ox~\L

.\LLRED and AGNES
.\.LLR ~~D, husband and wifl',

fll'fcndant and Res JHIIId ent,

and
I~ABELL

ALLHED,
Plaintiff in luterrcutio11
and Respondent.

I

Case
No. 9980

J

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATE~IENT

OF THE CASE

This action was commenced by the Administrator of
the estate of James F. Allred, deceased, to cancel and
set aside the delivery by an escrow agent to the Respondents \~onal Allred and Agnes Allred of certain instruments of conYeyance and to foreclose a contract of sale
Pntered into between James F. Allred, deceased, and his
,,·ife, the Respondent Isabell Allred, as sellers, and the
Respondents Yonal Allred and Agnes Allred as buyers.
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After the action was commenced the Respondent Isabell
Allred intervened as a plaintiff in the action, alleging
that the delivery of the instruments of conveyance had
been at her direction and in accordance with her agreement with her deceased husband.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court, upon the trial of the case, determined that the sellers under the contract, being the deceased James F. Allred and the Respondent Isabell Allred, had entered into an agreement to sell certain real
and personal property, title to some of which ·was held
individually by each of the sellers, and title to a portion
of which was held by the sellers as joint tenants. The
court concluded that the entering into of this contract
constituted an equitable conversion of the various interests in real and personal property to an i11terest in the
proceeds of the contract. The court further ruled that
the deceased and his wife, the Respondent Isn bell Allred,
had by agreement between themselves entitled "Letter of
Instructions'' executed subsequent to the contract of sale
(R 26, 27) created as between themselves a joillt tenancy
in the proceeds of the sale. The court held that title to the
right to receive these proceeds passed to the decedent's
wife, the Respondent Isabell Allred, upon his death, and
that accordingly the delivery of the instruments of conveyance to the Respondents Vonal Allred and Agnes
Allred, was a valid delivery in accordance "Tith the agreement of the parties, and dismissed the complaint of the
plaintiff.
2
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RELIIi~li,

SOVO HT ON APPEAL

rrhesc Hl•spoHdl'nts, and each of them, seek a determination by this Court that the action of the trial court
in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff was in ac('onlnm·p with the stipulated fads and the applicable law,
and tlwt the sante be affirmed.

ST.(\TEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondents are in substantial agreement with
the ~ta.tement of Facts as set out in the Brief of the Appellant. However, the Respondents differ with counsel
f'or the .(\.ppellant in his statements that the contract was
"delinquent'' or that it was "in default" at the time of
the dPath of James F. Allred. The court found (Tr. 86,
L. 16, ~-l; Tr. 87, L. 21) that there was $1,000 "due" (Tr.
86) or "due, owing and un,paid" (Tr. 87). Further the
Respondent Isabell Allred, in answer to the interrogatoril's of the Appellant (R 44) stated that the Respondent~ Yonal Allred and Agnes Allred had paid to the Re~pondent Isn bell Allred and her husband or had applied
for their benefit the total sum of $3,059.02. She further
stated that she had acquitted the balance of the purchase
price in return for an agreement for her support, made·
~nh~Pquent to the death of her husband. This statement was not contradicted or rebutted by the introduction of any contrary or conflicting evidence, and under
the circumstances, it would appear that use of the words
delinquent and default imply more than a finding that
tlwrr was an amount of $1,000 due or due, ozcing and unSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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paid. Further, counsel for the Appellant refers to the
delivery of the instruments of conveyance as a ''gift.''
While it is the contention of the Respondents and each of
them, that the Respondent Isabell Allred, had the right
to make such a gift if she so chose, the only evidence in
the record or the pleadings (R 44) relating to this aspect
of the conveyance negates a gift.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION.
Appellant contends that the deceased, James F. Allred, did not intend a gift to the Respondents Vonal Allred
and Agnes Allred. The Respondents each would agree
with this statement and point out that he did not, in fact,
make a gift to these Respondents, but created a joint
tenancy whereby the survivor of he and his wife would be
the sole owner of all the property owned by each and both
of them. By reason of this agreement and her husband's
death, Respondent Isabell Allred became the sole owner
of the property to dispose of it as she deemed fit. Counsel assails the application of the doctrine of equitable
conversion in this instance as ''repugnant to fundamental concepts of equity,'' and deplores the application of
the doctrine "to accomplish such inequitable results."
Just what inequities exist in a situation where a husband
and wife so arrange their affairs that the surYivor of
them will be the sole owner of all of the property of both
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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...

of them is difficult to see, and .Appellant, after observing
the inequities, does little to enlighten his reader as to
what they consist of. Apparently, however, it is con~idPred more equitable to give to the widow of the deet>dPnt one-third of his property, and to divide two-thirds
nmong his children, all of whom are grown and presumably self-supporting, and this notwithstanding the
fact that the a.greement signed by the deceased and hi~
wife (R ~7) provides that the purchasers shall pay "to
n:-; or the s1trriuor of us the sum of $17,000.00."
It is the position of the Respondents that, upon entering into the agreement of sale between the deceased,
,Jnmes F. Allred, and his wife, the Respondent Isabell
.\llred, as sellers, and the Respondents Vonal Allred and
.\g-nt~:'i .Allred, as buyers, that an equitable conversion
was efferted, and that the interests of the vendors in
the real and personal properties subject of the sale became an interest in the proceeds of the contract of sale.

At 19 Am . .Jur., P. 3, Para. 3, it is stated:
"It is well established that money directed to be
employed in the purchase of land, or land directed
to be sold and turned into money, is to be considered in that species of property into which it is
directed to be converted, regardless of the manner
in which direction is given. Whether money is
actually deposited or is only covenanted to be paid,
whether land is actually conveyed or only agreed
to be conveyed, the owner of the fund or property,
or the contracting parties, may make the land
money or the money land.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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See also 19 Am. Jur. 11, Para. 11, wherein it is stateu:
''Equitable conversion may be produced hy a rontractual obligation to exchange real estate for personalty, or personalty for real estate. In genrral,
it is only necessary that the contract be enforreable. Thus, an executory contract for the sale of
land works a conversion, since equity regardH
'things agreed to be done as actually performed'
and treats the vendor as holding the land in trust
for the purchaser and the purchaser as a trustee
of the purchase price to the vendor. The vendee
is, in the contemplation of equity, actually seised
of the estate . . . Enforceability at the time of
death of one of the parties refers to the validity of
the contract, and not to conditions which may not
have been performed because performance thereof was not due at the time of the death of the
testator. It is sufficient if these conditions can be
performed by the testator's representative. Where
a contract for the sale of land might have been
enforced against the vendor if he had lived, the
conversion from realty into personalty may be
completed, even though the vendee has not paid
the purchase price, and the contract is executory
in character.''
See further, 19 Am. Jur., P. 15, Para. 15, where it is
stated:
''A contract for the sale of land operates as an
equitable conversion; the vendee takes an equitable title, and his interest under the contract becomes realty ... (P. 16). The vendor holds the
legal title as trustee for the purchaser and as security for the payment of the purchase money."
See Hewitt v. Biege (Kan. 1958), 327 Pac. 2nd 872, a case
very similar to the instant case. See also In re Bakers
6
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Estaft·, 7H X.\r. ~nd 863, Annotated at 64 A.L.H. ~JI(l 902.

'rlw Court in this casp applied the doctrine of equitable
('om·prsion and held that the owners of the real property
terminated a joint tennney in the real property and created a tPHPnnry in common in the right to receiYe the proreeds thrrefrom, by the execution of a contract of sale.
Hmn'vPr, it will be noted that in the Baker case, the trial
<"onrt spPeitirally found that there was no intent to create
n joint tt>nn11ry in the proceeds of the sale, and consequently they were deemed to be held in common.

It should also be noted that counsel for the Appellant,
in his ~[ Pmorandum of Authorities submitted to the trial
rourt in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment
of the Plaintiff in Intervention, the Respondent Isabell
Allred, stated as follows:
•' I firmly believe that the law in Utah, although

there are no Utah Supreme Court decisions that I
can find on a contract of sale, that there is a equitable conversion and a joint tenancy in real property is terminated and the proceeds of the sale
is held as personal property. Since Utah does follow the doctrine of equitable conversion, the
Baker Y. Cobb case, 78 N.W. 2nd 863, would set a
precedent for the law in Utah. Since counsel
acknowledges that there is a equitable conversion,
I shall not go into any further detail in that portion of the memorandum.''
Further, on Page 4 of his 1\femorandum, counsel stated
as follows:
•' This equitable conversion of the real and personal property into a contract right took place on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1\Iay 27, 1958, four days before the letter of escrow
instructions were signed.''
Further, at the pretrial hearing of this matter held February 18, 1963, the court inquired of counsel for the
Appellant as to his position on the issue of equitable
conversion (Tr. 32, L. 18 to Tr. 33, L. 10, incl.). At this
time there appeared to he no dispute between the parties
as to the application of the doctrine.
At the trial of this matter, held April 29, 1963, counsel for the Appellant stated in the course of the proceedings (Tr. 47, L. 23):
"All right. Now our position is that the agreement of sale dated May 27, 1958, is controlling
and that determines the ownership of the remaining balance under this contract ... "
Further, at the time of the argument upon Appellant's Motion for a New Trial and to Amend (Tr. 72,
L. 3) counsel stated:
"Our position then and still is that there was
created here a tenancy in common, and this latter
agreement of May 31, was not sufficient to create
a joint tenancy as claimed by the defendants, the
plaintiff in intervention.''
And again counsel stated his position as follo"'S (Tr. 73,
L. 3):
''Our position at the time of the trial was and still
is that this agreement of May 27, which was the
contract of sale between Mr. and Mrs. James F.
Allred and Vonal Allred and his wife, created
a tenancy in common in this property.... "
8
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it would appear that Appellant has not only raised
tlw issue of the application of the doctrine of equitable
(•onversion for the first time on appeal, but has, in fad,
completely reversed the position taken by him before,
during and after the trial of this action.

POINT TWO
THE COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED
THAT THE LETTER OF ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS CREATED A JOINT TENANCY.
Following the execution of the contract of sale on
\fny 27, 1958, the sellers executed a "Letter of Instructions'' which provided as follows (R. 26, 27) :
The undersigned hereby deliver to you, the papers
and instructions hereinafter described to be held
and disposed of by you only in accordance with
the following instructions hereinafter set forth, to
which the undersigned irrevocably agree:
----------------··········------(Description of documents held
iu escrow.)

1. You shall make delivery to the purchaser of
all of the papers and documents hereinabove
enumerated, if, as, and when said purchasers
shall haYe paid to us or the survivor of usr the
sum of $17,000.00.
2. In the event said purchaser shall fail to pay
any of the installments provided for in that
certain agreement bearing date of the 27th
day of May, A.D., 1958, promptly and when
due, then upon our written demand, you shall
return to us all of said papers and documents,
whereupon your duties, responsibilities and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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liabilities of every kind and character under
the terms of this escrow shall cease and
terminate.
3. In the event both of us shall depart this life
during the term of this contract, then upon.
satisfa,ctory proof being made to you that both
of us are deceased all payments thereafter rlue
are to be abated and you are to make delivery
to the purchasers, all of the said papers and
instruments as though the purchase price had
been paid in full.
4. This escrow is not assignable.
(italics added)
It is the contention of the Respondents that the parties
to this agreement, the decedent and his wife, the Respondent Isabell Allred, by its execution created a joint
tenancy between themselves in the subject matter of the
contract of sale.
Respondents would agree that the statutory presumption, in the absence of a contrary intent being shown,
is that a tenancy in common is presumed. It seems clear
that historically, the common law favored joint tenancies; that with the passing of the feudal system, joint
tenancies came into disfavor, and that the result has been
various statutory enactments with regard to joint tenancies. These various statutes may prohibit, modify or
limit the estate of joint tenancy, or they may merely
change the common law presumption of a joint tenancy
to a statutory presumption of tenancy in common. See
Thompson on Real Property, Paragraph 172, Volume 4,
Page 36 (1961 Replacement Volume). The Utah Statute,

10
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.-,7 -1-.\ l "tah Codt> Annotated

1!).);~,

as amended
by lnws of 19.-,::, ( haptl•r !):~,Paragraph 1, is of the latter
ty}H', raising- a pn•snmption of tenancy in common, where
not expressed otlwrwisc. By the amendment of 1953, to
tlw prior general statement of presumption, there was
addt•d tlw elarifying statement:
1

"lT sP of the words 'joint tenaney' or 'with rights
of survivorship,' or' and to the surz:ivor of them,'
or words of similar import shall decla.re a joint
fc11a Jl<'.'f·" (italics added)

Thus it would appear that the legislative intent was to
more rlearly define the manner of creation of a joint tenanry hy the use of certain wording, which under the
~ta tutc "shall declare a joint tenancy," making the creation of a joint tenancy a matter of law when the prescribed wording is employed. See First Security Bank of
Ctah v. Burgi, 122 Utah 455, 251 Pac. 2nd 297, at Page
301, where the court states :
"vVhere an intention to create a joint account is
elearly expressed in a written contract executed
by the parties, which remains unaltered and there
is no evidence of fraud, undue influence, mistake,
or other infirmity, the question of intention ceases
to be an issue and the courts are bound by the
agreement. ''
also Holt Y. Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39 Pac. 2nd 715 and
casl)S therein cited.
sl)(l

It would seem clear that the property rights of the
sl•!krs under the contract, that is, the right to receive

the consideration under the contract, is a property interest which may properly be held in joint tenancy, if the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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~y

parties so intend. See In re Bakers Estate, and H e1ritt
v. Biege, heretofore cited, and sell also 14 Am. Jur. Page
81, Paragraph 10, wherein it is recited:
"It became settled at an early date that a tenancy of such character can exist in any kind of
property that is susceptible of being possessed in
severalty.''
The presumption arising under the Statute (57-1-5)
applies to an interest in real property and makes no reference to any presumption as to a joint tenancy in personalty. In this connection it seems pertinent to observp
that Utah is one of the four of the United States which
has adopted the l\iodel Interparty Agreement Act (15-3-1
to 4, U.C.A. 1953). While this act has not been construed
by the Utah Supreme Court, it appears that it would
have some application in the instant case. See /11 Re
V andergrifts Estate, 161 At. 898 (Pa. 1932), wherein this
act is construed as authorizing the wife, as a sole tenant,
to create by an appropriate conveyance, a tenancy by the
entirety in herself and her husband.
As to the unities rule, it will be recalled that prior
to 1953, attorneys generally felt that to obtain a strict
compliance with the unities rule, a '' strawman'' was necessary, ''thereby the parties would convey their separate
interest to a third part~T' and the third party would then
r..eeeveey to the parties as joint tenants. The question of
the necessity of this procedure was dispensed with by
the amendments of 57-1-5 U.C.A. 1953 by the laws of
1953, Chapter 93, Paragraph 1. Further, the property
suhjcd of the joint tenancy is not the individual items of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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real and personal property, lmt is the right to receive the
proceeds of the sale. As to this right, the unities of time,
interest, title and possession are present by reason of
the l'quitable conversion effected by the entering into of
t:hr co11trad of Hale.
Appellants, of necessity, characterize the "Letter of
Instructions'' entered into between the deceased and his
wi fp, as merely instructions to a third party without an~~
probative value in indicating the true relationship intended between the parties. It is submitted that the Letter of Instructions is a contract between :\fr. and ~Irs .
.\lln•d, to which they, as the signers, "irrevocably agree"
(R. ~fi). The parties to the escrow agreement, by its exerution, were not only complying with their agreement
under the contract of sale, but in addition were contracting })('tween themselves, in plain and unadorned language,
free of ambiguity and in strict compliance with the statutory requirements. Appellant conjectures at length as to
the intent of the parties. Applying the theory of Appellant and ignoring the use of the words ''or to the sur,·ivor of us,'' or at the most limiting them to making the
survivor a mere agent for the estate of the deceased,
Appellant would urge that the parties intended that on
the death of one, his or her estate would be distributed
under the laws of intestate, descent, one-third to the survivor of them and two-thirds equally among their children,
hut the payment of the two-thirds to his children would
abate in favor of the Respondent Vonal )dlred, when the
surviving spouse died. Stated another way, are the documents susceptible of a construction that, even though
~Ir. Allred intended that his surviving widow should reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ceive, by the laws of intestate succession, only one-third
of his portion of the proceeds of the contract, and that his
surviving children should receive in equal shares twothirds during her lifetime, that nevertheless, upon his
widow's death, the payments abated completPl,\', even
though the stU\'iYing spouse \Yas receiving only onethird of them~ And taking this argument one step further, how could the claimed interest of the Appellant
possibly be computed, inasmuch as Isabell Allred is still
living, and there is no way of determining \Yhether she
will live for the entire term of the sale agreement, and
therefore, no way of determining when the remainder of
the payments due under the sale agreement might abate.
Further, if the Appellant's theory is correct, and theRespondent Isabell Allred, under the escrow agreement, is
merely an agent for the collection of the sums due under
the contract, of '''hich she has acknowledged receipt from
the buyers, is not the remedy of the Appellant an action
for an accounting by the Respondent Isabell Allred as to
the payments received by her~ It is submitted that the
construction of the escrow instructions urged h.'' thr
Appellant lead necessarily to ridiculous results. It would
seem evident from a reading of the documents in evidence that both James and Isabell Allred, the vendors
under the contract, desired that they be provided for hy
the purchasers, the Respondents Vonal and Agnes Allred
during their lifetime from the proceeds of the sale, that
upon the death of one of them, the survivor would continue to be so provided for, as she is, and that upon thr
death of the surYivor the obligations of the purchasers
n11drr the contract \Yerr at an end.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT THREE
THAT rrHE .\ PPELLANrr FAILED TO ~IEET
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IMPOSED UPON
HI:\J l~ TH.\T HE FAILED TO REBUT THE
PRESU~IPTION OF JOINT TENANCY .

•\ t the trial of this action ( Tr. 44 to 52 incl.), the contract of sale ( R ~1-25), the Letter of Instructions ( R 26,
~7) and the Release of Escrow (R. 28, 29) were admitted
in ('Videll('e upon the stipulation of the parties. After
dis('ussiou of certain procedural stipulations, counsel
for the plaintiff rested (Tr. 52, L. 18) without calling any
witnesses. After further discussion counsel for the defendant and for the plaintiff in intervention, the Respondents herein advised the court (Tr. 56, L. 18, 25)
that upon the present state of the record, each rested. The
eonrt, at this stage of the proceedings (Tr. 56, L. 28)
addressed counsel for the plaintiff as follows :
''THE CouRT : So if I, and I am doing this to clarify the record so that we won't have any misunderstanding. You now rest, Mr. Frandsen t
''.:\In. FRANDSEN: Yes, sir.
''THE CouRT : And there is no further evidence
you desire to offer¥
":Jin. FRANDSEN : That is right."
.Appellant called no witnesses nor made any attempt by
testimony to rebut the presumption of joint tenancy
raised hy the use of the language of the Letter of Instructions, though all of the parties to the agreement then
liYing, as well as the attorney who prepared the agreements, were present in court. This court has repeatedly
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
];)
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held that the burden of rebutting the presumption of
joint tenancy, once the same is established by the use of
the appropriate language, is upon the party denying the
existence of the joint tenancy. See Braegger Y. Lovelrnlff,
12 Utah 2nd 384, 367 Pac. 2nd 177, wherein the rule is
stated as follows:
"In making such appraisal, it should be kept in
mind initiall~", that the burden was not upon the
defendant to make an affirmative showing of such
intent. As the survivor, she was presumed to he
the owner and the burden of attacking her ownership 'vas upon the plaintiff administrator."
See also I-I olt v. Bayes, heretofore cited.

POINT FOUR
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE
LETTER OF ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS DID
NOT CONSTITUTE AN ATTE~1:PTED TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIOX OF PROPERTY.
Counsel for the Appellant bases the first part of his
argument on this point on the premise that the contract
was delinquent, and that the court so found. If the words
delinquent and default as used by the Appellant are synonymous with the words due or due, owing a11d unpaid as
found by the court (Tr. 86, L. 16, 24; Tr. 87, L. 21) the
premise is a correct statement, but if these words are not
synonymous, Appellant's basic premise is in error.
See Gammon Y. Bunnell, 22 Utah 421, 64 Par. 958,
wherein the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the deceased, for consideration, had executed a deed and plarrd
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same in escrow, the escrow directing the holder, upon
the death of the grantor, and upon proof that the plaintiff
had paid to one ~[artha Anne Gammon $300 in gold
coin, to delin.'r the deed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff
nlleged that he had performed all of the conditions of the
Pscrow, had tendered the $300, which had been refused
and which was tendered into court, and demanded deliY<'l'Y of the deed. The defendant's demurrer to the complaint was sustained by the trial court, and the plaintiff
appealed. The Supreme Court of Utah reversed, holding
that the facts alleged in the complaint were admitted by
the demurrer, and that plaintiff was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. The court, in arriving at its decision,
comments (Page 959, Pac.) :

t hl'

''The purpose of the escrow having been accomplished, the plaintiff held the deed in the same
manner as he would have held it had it been delivered to him in the first instance. The intention
was that it should be the deed of the grantee when
the condition was complied with, and when complied \Yith, it would take effect from its first deliYery.'' (Citing numerous authorities)
The Court refers in its opinion to Section 3935, Revised
Statutes 1898, which is presently 75-11-26, Utah Code
Annotated 1953. See also 19 Am. Jur., Page 423, Paragraph 7, \vherein it is stated:
"In some cases the deed is deposited with a third
person to be delivered over to the grantee named
on the happening of a contingency, such as the
death of the grantor, plus the fulfillment of a
condition, such as the grantee taking care of the
grantor during the grantor's lifetime ; and if it is
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neeeessary to effectuate the deed that it be considered a present delivery of a present interest, it
will be so considered.''
See also 19 Am. Jur. 448, Para, 27, wherein it is stated:
"The death of the grantor ·while his deed is held
in escrow does not invalidate the instrument upon
its subsequent delivery."
These principals are clearly distinguishable from the
theory of an attempted testamentary disposition, as was
the case in First Security Banlc of Utah Y. Burgi, hPretofore cited.
CONCLUSION
The Respondents submit that the trial court correctly held, upon the evidence, that the deceased anrl his
wife, the Respondent Isabell Allred, effected an equitable
conversion of their respecti>:e interests in the Yarious real
and personal property subject of the contract of sale,
converting the same into the right to receive proceeds
of the sale; that the deceased and his wife thereafter, by
their mutual agreement contained in the Letter of Instructions to which each of them "irrevocably agreed"
and by a provision that the purchasers shall haYc paid
"to us or to the survivor of us" the purchase price created a joint tenancy between themselves; and that upon
the death of James F. Allred the property subject of the
contract became the separate property of the Respondent
Isabell Allred. Further, that the Appellant completely
failed to introduce any evidence of a contrary intent or
to rebut in any manner the presumption of joint tenancy
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raised by the agreement of the parties. Accordingly, the
ruling of the trial court, declaring the property to he the
sole property of the Respondent Isabell Allred on the
dC'ath of her husband and dismissing the complaint of
the Appellant, ~hould be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
LEE W. HOBBS
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
A. JOHN RUGGERI
Carbon County Court House
Price, Utah

Attorneys for Respondents

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19

